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Comments
An Offer You Can't Refuse: The Current
Status Of Plea Bargaining In California
Liberty and justice are not subjects for bargain and barter.'
In the past, the non-recognition of plea bargaining as an everyday fact
of life in our criminal justice system has led to many problems, including
the failure to develop an adequate procedure for the proper handling of
pleas developed in this manner. Now that the philosophy of both the
state and federal courts has changed in this respect,2 much needed
formal procedures should be designed and adopted. The federal govern-
ment appears to be taking this step with the adoption of sweeping
changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.3 In addition, in the
past ten years a number of studies have been conducted which examine
the criminal justice system and develop recommendations for improve-
ment, with the topic of plea bargaining constituting a major component
of these studies. The result of several of these has been the development
of either "minimum standards" or "model statutes" of criminal proce-
dure, three of these being issued in the last three years. These studies
1. Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 113 (5th Cir. 1957).
2. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); People v. West, 3 Cal.
3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970).
3. See THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
THE FEDERAL RULES oF CRIMINAL PROcEDURE (1974) Rule 11 at 25-36 (hereinafter
cited as PROP. AMEND. TO FED. RULS CR. PRoc.). (Unless otherwise indicated, refer-
ences to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure will be to this report.) These rule
changes were originally approved by the Supreme Court for adoption in August 1974,
however, adoption was delayed by Congress for a year to allow time for further study.
The new Rules were passed by Congress on July 31, 1975, and scheduled to take effect
on December 1, 1975, except for Rule 11 (e)(6), which became effective August 1, 1975.
Certain minor changes were made by Congress to the format of Rule 11 as proposed
by the Supreme Court, and these are discussed below. See notes 49, 52, 53, 56 and 148
infra and text accompanying. See generally H.R. 6799, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975)
at 4-7; Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 94-64, 89
Stat. 370, 371-72.
4. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY (1968) [hereinafter cited as and referred to
as A.B.A. STANDARDS]; AMERICAN LAw INmsrruTE, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIoN-
MENT PROCEDURE (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1972) [hereinafter cited as MOD. CODE PRE-
ARR. PRoc.]; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, REPORT ON THE COURTS (1973) [hereinafter cited as and referred to as N.A.C.
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were prompted in part by the fact that the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration requires all states to develop a comprehensive set of
standards in order to receive future federal funding under the 1968
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.5 In large part, however,
these studies are also the result of a general feeling that the methods and
techniques under which our system of criminal justice operates could be
greatly improved. In this connection, a committee of the State Bar of
California is currently studying the entire subject of plea bargaining."
This comment will define plea bargaining and examine both the
established constitutional requirements and the recent changes in federal
statutory law. California statutory and case law will be discussed, along
with the need for the adoption of some form of comprehensive scheme
in California. Finally, specific problems in formulating a comprehensive
plea bargaining scheme will be addressed, and the new Federal Rules
and model statutes mentioned above will be examined as potential
sources of solutions to these problems.
THE SUBSTANCE OF PLEA BARGAINING
A. Definition and Scope of Plea Bargaining
Plea bargaining may be defined as "the granting of certain con-
cessions to the defendant in the event he pleads guilty."17 While the de-
bate continues between the advocates8 and critics9 of the plea bargaining
process, the fact remains that it is firmly entrenched in our system of
justice, 10 and unless the funds suddenly become available with which to
conduct the vast number of trials which are now made unnecessary by
STANDARDS]; NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CoMMIssIoNEnS ON UNIFORm STATE LAWS, UNI-
FORm RuLES OF CRIMINAL PRocEDuRE (Proposed Final Draft 1974) Thereinafter cited as
UN. RULEs CR. Paoc.].
5. Edwards, The A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice and the N.A.C. Standards
and Goals: A Comparative Analysis, 12 AM. Cnrn. L REv. 363 (1974).
6. Annual Report of the Board of Governors, 49 CAL. S.B.J. 607, 620 (1974).
7. Lambros, Plea Bargaining and the Sentencing Process, 53 F.R.D. 509 (1972).
The A.B.A. Standards make an issue of the word "bargain," substituting instead "plea
discussion" and "plea agreement." A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 4, §3.1 at 61-62. In
this comment the words are used interchangeably.
8. See Wheatley, Plea Bargaining-A Case for its Continuance, 59 MAss. L.Q.
31 (1974); A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 4; MOD. CODE PRE-ARR. PRoc., supra note
4; UN. RuLEs CR. PRoc., supra note 4.
9. See Note, The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HAv. L. REv. 1387
(1970); N.A.C. STANDARDS, supra note 4; STATE OF CALIFORNIA JOINT LEGISLATrvE
CoMMIrTEE FOR REViSION OF Tm PENAL CODE, ThE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, at
vii (Penal Code Revision Project Staff Draft).
10. "Plea bargaining has become an accepted practice in American criminal pro-
cedure, 'an integral part of the administration of justice in the United States' ....
'he great majority of criminal cases are disposed of by pleas of guilty, and a substantial
number of these pleas are the result of prior dealings between the prosecutor and the
defendant or his attorney."' People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 604, 477 P.2d 409, 413,
91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 389 (1970) (citations omitted).
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this practice, it is likely to continue. This comment does not attempt to
take a position on the propriety of plea bargaining, but accepts it as an
everyday reality. The fact that the United States Supreme Court in
Santobello v. New York11 referred to plea bargaining as an "essential
component of the administration of justice . . . to be encouraged,"12
and that the California Supreme Court in People v. West 3 referred to it
as "'essential for the expeditious and fair administration of justice,' ",s
would seem to make the issue of propriety largely moot from a judicial
point of view.
Accurate statistics on the scope or pervasiveness of plea bargaining
are not available, partially due to the atmosphere of secrecy in which the
practice has been conducted. 15 It is known that felony convictions based
on guilty pleas (by definition the net result of all plea bargains) run
between 67% and 93% in state courts,'5 and approximate 84% in
federal courts.'7 There is no data kept on what percentage of these
guilty pleas actually results from plea bargains, but one survey placed
the figure in excess of 70% in some jurisdictions. 18  It would seem
reasonable to conclude that at the present time, plea bargaining is a
widespread, judicially acknowledged and most likely essential element of
the criminal justice system. What procedure should be used to imple-
ment the pracice and what limitations should be placed upon it are
questions which will be considered later in this comment.
B. The Constitutional Requirements
Plea bargaining is not per se unconstitutional.1 " By definition, how-
ever, the process involves a guilty plea,20 and this brings into play
federal constitutional protections. The ramifications of a guilty plea are
much more far-reaching than a confession since in pleading guilty, an
accused waives all of the constitutional rights to which he would normal-
11. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
12. Id. at 260.
13. 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970).
14. Id. at 604, 477 P.2d at 413, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
15. Id. at 609, 477 P.2d at 417, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
16. TMHE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS at 9 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK
FORCE REPORT]. The figure for California in 1972 was 71.5%. STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
IN CALIFORNIA 1972, REFERENCE TABLES at 6.
17. 1.974 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS at A-58.
18. Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty
Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 896-99 (1964). These figures are dated now, but this
study is apparently the only attempt at empirical research that has been conducted in
this field.
19. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 265 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
20. See note 8 supra and text accompanying.
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ly be entitled in a trial. Specifically, this waiver involves those rights
guaranteed under the fifth and sixth amendments, including the right to
remain silent, the right to a speedy trial by jury, the right to confront
witnesses, and the right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.21 In addition, a defendant also waives any collaterally related
non-jurisdictional defects.22 In emphasizing the point, and stressing the
seriousness of a guilty plea, the United States Supreme Court has stated
that:
A plea of guilty differs in purpose and effect from a mere admis-
sion or an extrajudicial confession; it is itself a conviction. Like a
verdict of a jury, it is conclusive. More is not required; the court
has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence.m
As with other constitutional rights, an accused may waive the safe-
guards referred to. However, the Court has held that to satisfy the
constitutional requirement of due process,2 4 any such waiver must be
knowing, voluntary, and entered with a full understanding of the nature
of the charge and the consequences of the plea.25 The Court has stated
that "[w]hat is at stake for the accused facing death or imprisonment
demands the utm( solicitude of which courts are capable. "26 and
that a waiver of the important rights associated with a plea of guilty will
not be presumed from a silent record.
To determine the voluntariness of a guilty plea, the Court adopted the
test suggested by Judge Tuttle of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit:
"[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct conse-
quences, including the actual value of any commitments made to
him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless
induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harass-
ment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable
21. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 (Douglas, J. concurring); Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466
(1969).
22. Collateral rights waived might relate to: an illegal search, illegal arrest, im-
properly obtained confession, improper identification practices, absence or ineffective-
ness of counsel, running of the statute of limitations, improperly obtained indictment,
and the rights to change of venue, bail, severance, speedy trial, public trial, and compul-
sory process. I. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE AccusED-PRE-TRIAL RIGHTS,
§105 at 545-51 (1972). See also People v. Archuleta, 16 Cal. App. 3d 295, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 881 (1971).
23. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
24. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (applying the due
process clause of the 5th amendment); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 244-46
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting), (applying 14th amendment due process).
25. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970); Boykin v. Ala-
bama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
26. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969).
27. Id. at 243.
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promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature im-
proper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business
(e.g., bribes)." (citation omitted) 28
While it is clear that any form of coercion which destroys voluntari-
ness is prohibited,29 the line has not proved easy to draw. The court has
refused to find a lack of voluntariness where the plea was accompanied
by protestations of innocence, 30 where the plea was induced by fear of
the death penalty if found guilty after a trial," or where claims were
made of a conflict of interest on the part of defense counsel representing
others in a related proceeding. 2
The Court added the additional requirement in Santobello that
"when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agree-
ment of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the induce-
ment or consideration, such a promise must be fulfilled."33 The Court
indicated that as a remedy for a broken promise, the defendant was
entitled to either specific performance of the bargain or the opportunity
to withdraw the guilty plea.34
Other due process requirements established by the Court include the
right to be represented by counsel during all proceedings involving a
plea,35 the rigt to be assisted by counsel in choosing whether to plead
guilty,3 and the requirement that the court personally address the
accused to insure that the standards of voluntariness and understanding
outlined above are met. 37 Failure of the record to indicate that this latter
requirement has been met has been held to be reversible error.3 8 Thus
28. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).
29. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970); United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968); Marchibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962).
30. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
31. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). It must still -be shown that the
plea was voluntarily and intelligently made. Compare with United States v. Jackson,
390 U.S. 570 (1968)--conviction based on the same statute reversed. The guilty plea
in Brady was based as much on the fact that his co-defendant had plead guilty and
agreed to testify for the prosecution as on any possible coercion from the unconstitu-
tional statute.
32. Dukes v. Warden, 406 U.S. 250 (1972).
33. 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
34. Mr. Justice Douglas was of the opinion that the defendant should be allowed
whichever remedy he chooses, since under the circumstances of a particular case, justice
may be better served by one rather than the other. Id. at 267 (Douglas, J., concurring).
35. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723 (1948). For the suggestion that
proof of the adequacy of counsel was established as a requirement by Boykin, see The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 187 (1969).
36. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
37. The court must "[canvas] the matter with the accused." Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 23g, 244 (1969).
38. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 472 (1969). Prior to Boykin, the
California position was that the court need only advise the defendant of his right to
counsel, but need not inform him of the consequences of the plea, as this was thought
to b. the responsibility of counsel. In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 129, 460 P.2d 449, 454,
81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 582 (1969).
1976 / Plea Bargaining
far, the Court has declined to establish a specific set of inquiries which
must be made of a defendant to eliminate any doubt that the essential
constitutional requirements have been satisfied. At least two justices feel
that the Court should spell out the constitutional limits of plea bargain-
ing,39 and it is possible that in the future the Court will require specific
interrogatories to be used such as those established in Miranda v.
Arizona40 relating to self incrimination.
FEDERAL STATUTORY LAW GOVERNING PLEA BARGAINING
In the federal court system, a trial judge is free to allow or completely
prohibit plea bargains in the courtroom.4' If the practice is permitted,
the acceptance of guilty pleas and therefore plea bargains is governed by
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,4" coupled with the
mandates of the United States Constitution.4"
In its original form, Rule 11 required the court accepting a guilty plea
to first determine that it was voluntary and made with an understanding
of the nature of the charge." The 1966 amendment, in addition to
providing for pleas of nolo contendere, added the requirement that the
court satisfy the "voluntariness" and "understanding" elements by per-
sonally addressing the defendant, and extended the scope of the defend-
ant's required understanding to include the consequences of the plea."
Also added was a requirement that the court must satisfy itself that there
was a factual basis for the plea. This latter element
was not intended to allow courts another means of showing that a
defendant understood the charges against him. Rather, its pur-
pose, according to the Advisory Committee on Rules, is to protect
defendants who understand the charge and who plead voluntarily,
but who do not understand that their "conduot does not .aotually
fall within the charge."46
39. Corpus Et Al. v. Estelle, Corrections Director, Et AL., 469 F.2d 646, 953, 956,
1075 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 932, 933 (1973) (Douglas, and Marshall, JJ., dis-
senting).
40. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
41. 121 CONG. REc. 5929-30 (1975) (remarks of Congressman Hagedorn).
42. Mr. Justice Harlan was of the opinion that the provisions of Rule 11 were ap-
plicable to the states. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 245 (1969) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting). See note 86 infra and text accompanying.
43. The Rules were originally adopted in 1946. Rule 11 has been subject to one
prior amendment, in 1966. See Hoffman, What Next in Federal Criminal Rules?, 21
WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1 (1964) for a discussion of the procedure for the formulation
and adoption of federal rules.
44. Court decisions interpreting the meaning of this requirement are "legion." Id.
at 9. See, e.g., Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); Aiken v. United States,
296 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1961); Smith v. United States, 265 F.2d 99 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
45. Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (As amended February 28,
1966) 18 U.S.C. Appendix at 4489 (1970).
46. Gentile, Fair Bargains and Accurate Pleas, 49 B.U.L. Rav. 514, 521 (1969).
See also 2 ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PRACTICE UNDER THE FEDERAL RuLEs, §11:73 at 147
(1966).
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The recent amendments significantly expand the scope of Rule 11.
Most importantly, the amendments establish a procedure for handling
plea agreements, removing any vestige of mystery or suspicion still
connected with the practice. 7 In so doing, the amendments answer the
doubts expressed by some courts as to whether the procedure followed
under the old Rule 11 was certain to uncover a plea bargain, since
failure to do so leaves the defendant with little remedy if the terms of the
bargain are not adhered to.48
The new procedure for plea agreements is established in subdivision
(e). Section (1) of subdivision (e) establishes the three acceptable
concessions which the prosecuting attorney may make in negotiating a
plea with the accused, and prohibits the court from participating in these
discussions. 9 Subdivision (e) (2) calls for disclosure of any plea
agreement on the record; the judge is then given the option to accept or
reject the agreement, or postpone making a decision until the presen-
tence report is received.50 Subdivisions(e) (3) and (4) provide the pro-
cedure for the actual acceptance or rejection of the plea. The significant
features are that if the agreement is accepted, the defendant learns im-
mediately what the maximum sentence will be, and in the event the
agreement is rejected, the defendant has an opportunity to withdraw the
guilty plea. In this respect, -the new procedure complies with the require-
ments of the Santobello decision.5 Subdivision (e) (3) is noteworthy in-
sofar as it limits the judge, if the agreement is accepted, to the actual
47. THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, ADVISORY COMMrrrEE NoTn at 27 (1974)[hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMMTrEE NoTE].
48. See, e.g., Hilliard v. Beto, 465 F.2d 829, 831-32 (5th Cir. 1972).
49. The concessions which the prosecuting attorney may make in return for a
guilty plea to the charged offense, or to a lesser or related offense are that he will: (1)
move for dismissal of other charges; or (2) recommend or not oppose the imposition
of a particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation shall not be
binding upon the court (this latter phrase was added in the Senate); or (3) agree that
a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case (also added in the Senate).
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 94-64, §3, 89 Stat.
370, 371. The participation of the trial judge has been a topic of much controversy
among legal writers. Compare Underwood, Let's Put Plea Discussions-and Agree-
ments-On Record, 1 Loy. U.L.J. 1, 5 (1970) (advocating participation) with Gentile,
Fair Bargains and Accurate Pleas, 49 B.U.L. REV. 514, 525 (1969) and Thomas, Plea
Bargaining: The Clash Between Theory and Practice, 20 Loy. L. REV. 303, 304 (1974)[hereinafter cited as Thomas] (advocating abstention). See also notes 120-125 infra and
text accompanying.
50. Concurrent changes to Rule 32 would allow the judge, with the defendant's
consent, to inspect the presentence report at any time before or after a plea is entered.
This change represents a major step toward improving correctional policy, and an-
swers the complaints of many writers. See, e.g., Newman and NeMoyer, Issues of
Propriety in Negotiated Justice, 47 DEN. L.J. 367, 401-04 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Newman and NeMoyer]; Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286, 297(1972). See also notes 126-136 infra and text accompanying.
51. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). The other remedy provided for in Santobello, specific
performance, would not apply in this type of situation, as the plea has not at this point
been accepted by the court.
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terms of the agreement.5 2 Subdivision (e) (5) allows for better schedul-
ing of criminal cases by allowing the court to establish a time limit within
which the parties must arrive at an agreement. The remaining provision
of Subdivision (e) forbids admission of a proposed but withdrawn guilty
plea in any subsequent civil proceeding, but does allow admission of the
statements in a perjury proceeding.53
In addition to recognizing the propriety of plea bargaining, the other
main objective of the recent amendments was to clarify the advice which
must be given to the defendant to insure that an informed plea is
made.54 The revised Rule 11 (c) retains the requirements of its prede-
cessor that the defendant must understand the nature of the charge to
which he is pleading, but limits the required knowledge of the conse-
quences of such a plea to require only a statement of the maximum and
minimum sentences connected with the offense. 5 There are new re-
quirements that the defendant be advised of his right against self-
incrimination and of his rights to counsel, to a trial by jury, and to
confront and cross-examine witnesses. In addition, there are warnings
added by the Congress that the defendant may be questioned by the
judge about the offense (with the risk of perjury for false statements),
and about the finality of the plea.5"
The requirement that the plea must be voluntary is expanded in
subdivision (d) to include an inquiry as to whether the guilty plea is the
result of a plea agreement, which allows the judge to insure that the plea
was not induced by threats or improper promises," and that the defend-
ant receives the benefit of his bargain, in accordance with the mandates
of Santobella. The new rules specify that the discussions with the
accused regarding voluntariness and understanding must be conducted
in open court, possibly with the intent of facilitating the making of a
52. The original amendment approved by the Supreme Court allowed the judge the
option of imposing another sentence "more favorable to the defendant." The House was
apparently concerned about having the prosecution's bargain "undermined by a lenient
judge," and this change could be construed as a significant infringement on judicial dis-
cretion. 121 CONG. REc. 5642 (1975) (remarks of Congressmen Holtzman and
Wiggins) and 5930 (1975) (remarks of Congressman Hagedom).
53. Rule 1l(e)(6), PROP. AMEND. TO FED. RULE S Ca. PRoc., supra note 3, at 27.
The provision with respect to perjury proceedings was added by Congress. See H.R.
6799, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) at 5.
54. The intent behind the rule change in this area was to incorporate the require-
ments of Boykin, 395 U.S. 238. ADvIsoRY CoMMrrrEE NOTE, supra note 47, at 28. The
amendments also further refine the requirements for accepting pleas of nolo contendere,
which are not discussed in this comment.
55. The revised Rules reject the concept that the court is required to outline the
collateral consequences of a plea of guilty such as parole violation problems, registration
as a sex offender, civil consequences of being a convicted felon, recidivist statutes, etc.
For a discussion of the consequences of being a parolee subject to the Adult Authority
in California, see Johnson, Multiple Punishment and Consecutive Sentences: Reflections
on the Neal doctrine, 58 CAL. L. REV. 357, 379-89 (1970).
56. Rule 11(c)(4), (5), H.R. 6799, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) at 5.
57. AnvisoaY CoMMIrrEE NorE, supra note 47, at 30.
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record, as required by McCarthy v. United States.58 Subdivision (f)
retains the requirement of a factual basis for the plea as previously
encompassed in Rule 11, and subdivision (g) requires a verbatim
record of the proceedings demonstrating, inter alia, the inquiry into the
voluntariness and accuracy of the plea. The significance of the new
Rules with respect to California law lies in the fact that as the most
comprehensive statute governing plea bargains yet enacted, the Federal
Rules may serve as a guide for modification of state laws. In addition, an
argument can be made that these rules are or will be made binding on
the states."
THE PRESENT STATUS OF PLEA BARGAINING IN CALIFORNIA
It has been established in California, as in the federal courts, that a
guilty plea is not invalid strictly because it is the product of plea
bargaining. 0 Nevertheless, in his dissent in In re Tahl,6 Justice Peters
of the California Supreme Court called for a more precise and open
handling of the motivating factor for most guilty pleas-plea bargains."
California law relating to guilty pleas and plea bargains has gone
beyond the mere meeting of constitutional requirements, although it is
less clearly defined than federal law under the new federal rules.
A. Statutory Law
The California Penal Code contains several sections relating to plea
bargaining, most significantly Section 1192.5, which the California
Supreme Court referred to one month after its enactment in November
1970, as an indication of "growing legislative recognition and approval
of plea bargaining."" Section 1192.5 allows a defendant to condition
his guilty plea upon any sentence that is within the court's power to
impose, including the granting of probation or the complete suspension
of the sentence-if this condition is accepted by the prosecuting attor-
ney. 64 If so accepted, the trial court must at least consider the defend-
ant's offer, and it has been held to be an abuse of discretion to arbitrari-
ly refuse to do so."5 The court must advise the defendant that it is not
58. 394 U.S. 459, 466-67 (1969).
59. See notes 84-86 infra and text accompanying.
60. See In re Hawley, 67 Cal. 2d 824, 433 P.2d 919, 63 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1967);
In re Madrid, 19 Cal. App. 3d 996, 97 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1971).
61. 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969).
62. Id. at 138, 460 P.2d at 460-61, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 588-89.
63. People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 608, 477 P.2d 409, 416, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 392
(1970).
64. This procedure has been referred to as a "statutory plea bargain." People v.
West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 607, 477 P.2d 409, 416, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 392 (1970).
65. People v. Smith, 22 Cal. App. 3d 25, 99 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1971).
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bound by the plea;6 6 however, if the court wishes to impose a more
severe sentence, the defendant must be allowed an opportunity to with-
draw the plea,6" and must be advised of this option by the court.6 8
Under the terms of section 1192.5, any plea so withdrawn cannot be
admitted into evidence in any type of civil or criminal proceeding
against the defendant. This provision also calls for the court to make an
inquiry of the defendant to "satisfy itself that the plea is freely and
voluntarily made, and that there is a factual basis for such plea." Section
1192.5 was the successor to section 1192.3 (enacted in 1957), which
only allowed a defendant to specify the punishment which a jury might
impose, and did not contain any of the additional provisions outlined
above. Section 1192.5 has been held not to apply to cases in which a
defendant pleads not guilty and submits the matter of guilt or innocence
to the trial court on the transcripts of the preliminary hearing.6 9
There are other California Penal Code provisions which have an
effect on plea bargaining. Section 1192.1 allows a defendant to limit a
guilty plea in the case of a crime divided into multiple degrees to a
specified degree. When the prosecuting attorney agrees to this condition,
and it is accepted by the court, the defendant may not be convicted of
any higher degree of the crime. Section 1192.2 establishes the same
procedure before a committing magistrate. Section 1192.4 provides for
automatic withdrawl of a guilty plea entered pursuant to sections 1192.1
and 1192.2, and subsequent inadmissibility in any civil or criminal
proceedings, similar to the provisions of section 1192.5 discussed above.
Case law has construed section 1192.4 to include offers to plead guilty
under the protection of this code section as well as actual pleas. 70 Prior
to the passage of section 1192.4 in 1957, evidence of such pleas and
offers to plead were admissible.71 One California appellate decision has
stated that the obvious purpose of these enactments "is to promote the
public interest by encouraging settlement of criminal cases without the
necessity of trial. ' 2
66. "When the court does not inform the defendant, prior to acceptance of his plea,
that its approval is not binding, the court may not withdraw its approval at the time
set for hearing on the application for probation or pronouncement of judgment."
Cacilhas v. Super. Ct., App. 110 Cal. Rptr. 661, 665 (1973) (hearing ordered January
10, 1974).
67. People v. Ramos, 26 Cal. App. 3d 108, 102 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1972).
68. People v. Johnson, 10 Cal. 3d 868, 519 P.2d 604, 112 Cal. Rptr. 556 (1974).
This represents a change from prior case law under People v. Delles, 69 Cal. 2d 906,
447 P.2d 629, 73 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1968).
69. Martinez v. Super. Ct., 36 Cal. App. 3d 683, 111 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1973).
70. People v. Wilson, 60 Cal. 2d 139, 383 P.2d 452, 32 Cal. Rptr. 44 (1963);
People v. Hamilton, 60 Cal. 2d 105, 383 P.2d 412, 32 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1963). See CAL.
Evm. CODE §1153.
71. Id.
72. People v. Woltz, 222 Cal. App. 2d 340, 343, 35 Cal. Rptr. 160, 162 (1963).
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B. Case Law
The California statutes relate only to pleading guilty to lesser degrees
of an offense (1192.1, 1192.2), or to specifying the sentence upon
which the plea is conditioned (1192.5). The California Supreme Court
pointed out in People v. West,73 however, that these statutory provisions
serve as guidelines for plea bargains involving pleas to lesser offenses
74
-apparently referring to the statutory provisions for acceptance and
rejection of the plea, inquiries on voluntariness and factual basis, and
withdrawal and inadmissibility of the plea.75 In addition, various deci-
sions have specifically addressed the different aspects of plea bargaining
and its product-guilty pleas.
Many cases have dealt with the applicability of the requirements of
the U.S. Constitution. In In re Tahl"0 the California Supreme Court,
after determining that the more demanding provisions of Boykin v.
Alabama were only to be applied prospectively, 77 took a very conserva-
tive approach in specifying what must appear on the trial court record to
satisfy the due process requirements in California. 8 The court rejected
the notion that the required waiver could be based on a "reasonable
presumption" that the defendant acted voluntarily and intelligently, and
made it clear that inferences of such a waiver were no longer accepta-
ble.79 In the future the trial record must reflect on its face that the
constitutional rights involved were "specifically and expressly enumer-
ated [by the court, not by counsel] for the benefit of and waived by the
accused [not by counsel] prior to the acceptance of his guilty plea."80
The court went on to express the caveat that although the federal
constitutional requirements could be met with something less than the
procedure outlined, lower courts would be well advised to "err on the
side of caution", and avoid the possiblity of convictions being reversed
in subsequent challenges. 81 The rights requiring voluntary and intelli-
gent waiver are those fifth and sixth amendment rights discussed
above,82 and in addition the record must reflect that the defendant was
aware of the nature and consequences of the plea. 88
73. 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970).
74. Id. at 608, 477 P.2d at 416-17, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93.
75. See text preceding note 69 supra.
76. 1 Cal. 3d 122, 460 P.2d 449, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969).
77. -Id. at 133-35, 460 P.2d at 456-58, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 584-86 (1969).
78. See id. at 130-33, 460 P.2d at 454-57, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 584-86 (1969).
79. Id. at 131, 460 P.2d at 455-56, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 583-84.
80. Id. at 132, 460 P.2d at 456, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
81. id.
82. See notes 21 and 22 supra and text accompanying.
83. In re Tahl, I Cal. 3d 122, 132, 460 P.2d 449, 456, 81 Cal. Rpt. 577, 584(1969).
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The net effect of this holding was to make the bulk of Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (as then structured) binding in
California. 4 The only element missing was the requirement of a "fac-
tual basis" for the plea, which was subsequently added by statute in
California." The significance of this lies in the sweeping amendments
to Rule 11 which have been recently adopted. If the Supreme Court
made the provisions of the present Rule 11 binding on the states, as
Justice Harlan said the Boykin decision did,85 it is at least possible that
future versions of the rule would also be constitutionally mandated.
Even if this is not the case, since the California Supreme Court made the
essence of Rule 11 applicable to California (apparently voluntarily), it
is possible that it would follow a similar course of action with respect to
a new version of the rule. The uncertainty created by such considerations
supports an argument for the adoption of a comprehensive scheme in
California to clarify the current California policy relating to plea bar-
gaining.
The remainder of California case law relating to plea bargaining was
formulated in West.87 After affirming the validity of the practice, the
court went on to decry the ritualistic exercise of defendants pleading
guilty while denying the plea was conditioned upon any sort of agree-
ment with the prosecuting attorney, 8 and established the requirement
that the plea bargain must be clearly incorporated in the record of the
case, suggesting four possible ways this might be done. 9 Of great
significance is -the fact that the court went on to hold that the guilty
plea could be to any reasonably related offense, and did not have to
be one necessarily included in the crime charged. 90  In People v.
84. This was exactly the effect Mr. Justice Harlan indicated the Boykin decision
had. 395 U.S. 238, 245 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
85. CAL. PEN. CODE §1192.5.
86. Mr. Justice Harlan's view was that the reversal in Boykin (based on the inade-
quacy of the record in showing a knowing and intelligent waiver of constitutional rights)
made the procedures of Rule 11 "substantially applicable to the states as a matter of
federal constitutional due process." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 247 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
87. 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1970).
88. Id. at 609, 477 P.2d at 417, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 393.
89. Id. at 610, 477 P.2d at 418, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 394. The methods suggested
by the court are: (1) the bargain could be stated orally and recorded by the court re-
porter; (2) it could be set forth by the clerk in the minutes of the court; (3) a written
stipulation could be filed by the parties stating the terms of the bargain; or (4) forms
prepared by counsel or the court for the purpose of recording plea bargains could be
utilized. See also In re Sutherland, 6 Cal. 3d 666, 669 n.3, 493 P.2d 857, 859 n.3, 100
Cal. Rptr. 129, 131 n.3 (1972).
90. People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 613, 477 P.2d 409, 420, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 396
(1970). In so doing, the court adopted the philosophy of A.B.A. Standard §3.1(b) (ii),
defining a reasonably related offense as: (1) the same type of offense charged or (2)
an offense which he may have committed during the course of conduct which led to the
charge. The mere fact of pleading guilty is not enough, however, and the defendant
must be able to have been convicted of either the offense to which he plead guilty or
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Ramos,"' the court endeavored to formulate the attitude which all
parties involved in the plea bargaining process should possess:
The idea behind court participation in plea bargaining is to spread
the entire bargain on the table and make it part of the record. (ci-
tation omitted) Implicit in the concept is the requirement all par-
ticipants must conduct themselves openly and with utmost fair-
ness.92
With respect to remedies for broken promises, California law would
appear to comport with the requirements of Santobello,93 in that either
withdrawal of the plea or specific performance of the bargain are
granted as remedies. Where a promise to a defendant is breached by the
prosecuting attorney, California has traditionally allowed the defendant
to withdraw the guilty plea,94 even after pronouncement of judgment.,;
Where the promise has been breached by the judge, California courts
appear to grant an option of withdrawal of the plea or specific perform-
ance of the bargain,96 even though this latter remedy is not mentioned in
Section 1192.5 of the Penal Code.97 In any event, it certainly seems that
whatever remedy of state chooses to offer in this area should be clearly
defined and capable of easy reference. It almost goes without saying that
before the defendant can even begin to pursue either remedy, or before
the state can adequately mount a defense to such a claim, a clear and
detailed record of the proceedings in the trial court is requried.98
C. The Need for a Comprehensive Scheme in California
With the exception of the statutory provisions relating to pleas to a
lesser degree of the charged offense 9 and specification of the sentence
the one he was originally charged with. See People v. Crumpton, 9 Cal. 3d 463, 507
P.2d 74, 106 Cal. Rptr. 770 (1973). Also, the conduct must be of a nature proscribed
by the state. See In re Madrid, 19 Cal. App. 3d 996, 97 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1971); In
re Scruggs, 15 Cal. App. 3d 290, 93 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1971).
91. 26 Cal. App. 3d 108, 102 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1972).
92. Id. at 111, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 504. (The court did not tell the defendant that
pleading guilty might result in revocation of probation on a prior offense.)
93. See generally Fischer, Beyond Santobello-Remedies for Reneged Plea Bar-
gains, 2 U. SAN FERN. V.L. REV. 121 (1973).
94. People v. Barajas, 26 Cal. App. 3d 932, 937, 103 Cal. Rptr. 405, 408 (1972).
(Relief denied, however, since the defendant did not move to withdraw his plea in the
trial court.)
95. People v. Wadkins, 63 Cal. 2d 110, 113, 403 P.2d 429, 432, 45 Cal. Rptr. 173,
176 (1965).
96. People v. Flores, 6 Cal. 3d 305, 308-09, 491 P.2d 406, 408, 98 Cal. Rptr. 822,
824 (1972); Martinez v. Super. Ct., 36 Cal. App. 3d 683, 686, 111 Cal. Rptr. 678, 680
(1973).
97. A complete comparison of these two remedies is beyond the scope of this com-
ment, but in general it can be said that there are situations where withdrawal of the
plea will not restore the status quo ante, and others where it is perfectly adequate.
98. The problems which can arise in the absence of such a record are illustrated
in Martinez v. Super. Ct., 36 Cal. App. 3d 683, 111 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1973).
99. CAL. PEN. CODE §§1192.1, 1192.2.
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to be imposed, 100 a substantial portion of the California law relating to
plea bargaining is presently uncodified. Even though the California
Supreme 'Court in West recommended using section 1192.5 as a model
for these situations, a question naturally arises whether greater organiza-
tion and formalization of the law in the form of a comprehensive scheme
would not be beneficial for all parties involved in the criminal justice
system. This more standardized approach would seem particularily ben-
eficial to attorneys who handle only an occasional criminal matter.
Certainly, in an area where personal rights and liberties are involved,
the accused has much to lose,' and therefore the utmost in precision
and exactness should be required to insure that the proceedings are fair
and just beyond any question or doubt.
In referring to the procedures surrounding plea bargaining, one writer
has stated: "Little statutory guidance has emanated from the states or
federal government and confusion reigns in the courts." 102 While this
probably overstates the case, particularly with respect to California, 10 3
nevertheless, this entire area of the law is generally characterized by a
lack of statutory enactments and formalization. In 1969, Justice Mosk
of the California Supreme Court wrote: "California law provides rela-
tively few pronouncements, either legislative or judicial, regarding the
acceptance of a guilty plea. .. .104 Although section 1192.3 was on
the books at the time this statement was made, section 1192.5 and its
interpretation and expansion in West were still a year away. One may
still inquire, however, whether these later developments completely an-
swer Justice Mosk's desire for more firmly established guidelines.
Much of the law relative to plea bargaining is new. It would not be
unusual in such a rapidly developing area that a statute such as section
1192.5 would need amendment or replacement four years after its
passage. It is not essential, however, that a comprehensive scheme be
developed through statutory enactment. In fact, a recent article dealing
with implementation of the A.B.A. Standards recommends adoption by
court rule as the "quickest and most effective means" of initiating this
type of change. 105
Regardless of the implementation device, now that plea bargaining
has been taken out of the shadows, social and public policy would seem
100. CAL. PEN. CODE §1192.5.
101. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
102. Gallagher, A Voluntary Trap, TRIAL Vol. 9, No. 3 at 23 (May/June 1973).
103. The recent revision of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
would appear to answer any charge of lack of specificity in the federal court system.
104. In re Tahl, 1 Cal. 3d 122, 127, 460 P.2d 449, 452, 81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 580
(1969).
105. Wilson, Implementation by Court Rule of the Criminal Justice Standards, 12
AM. CGIM. L. REv. 323, 355 (1974).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 7
to require a clear, definitive, easily accessible set of standards to which
the practitioner can turn. In addition, in order to participate in the
federal funding available under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, each state must enact a comprehensive plan of law
enforcement and criminal justice. 1 6 The Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, which administers these funds, is requiring each state to
have a comprehensive set of standards established by fiscal year 1976.107
Standards relative to plea bargaining constitute a logical and necessary
part of such a plan.
This position can be supported by the fact that several bodies (other
than the federal government) such as the American Bar Association,
American Law Institute, National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, and the National Advisory Commission on Crimi-
nal Justice Standards and Goals, have proposed models upon which to
base a statutory scheme.'08 In an article calling for adoption of legisla-
tion based on the A.B.A. Standards, Justice Erickson of the Colorado
Supreme Court has said that they will "bring accuracy and finality to
pleas of guilty and will increase the respect and efficiency of our
criminal justice system."'109 Former Justice Tom Clark has referred to
the A.B.A. Standards as "the right thing at the right time."' 10  To
date, fifteen states have implemented the A.B.A.Standards-either par-
tially or in their entirety-through legislation, formal court rules, or by
judicial citation by the highest state court."' California law is not so
dissimilar from the plea bargaining proposals contained in the Stand-
ards -that the minor differences could not be easily resolved."12  The
next logical step would be to include all desirable procedures relative to
plea bargaining and pleas of guilty in one comprehensive scheme.
Whether accomplished via statute, court rule, or judicial citation, one
of the first steps in developing such a scheme must be to identify those
areas of present law where deficiencies exist. Some of these areas will be
identified in the next section, and recommendations for improvement,
based on the sources previously discussed, will be made.
106. Edwards, The A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice and the N.A.C. Standards
and Goals: A Comparative Analysis, 12 AM. CRm. L. REv. 363 (1974) (citations
omitted).
107. Id. at 363-64.
108. See note 4 supra.
109. Erickson, The Finality of a Plea of Guilty, 48 NOT. DAME LAw. 835, 849
(1973).
110. Clark, The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice: Prescrip-
tion for an Ailing System, 47 NoT. DAME LAw. 429 (1972).
111. AMmucAN BAR ASSOCITION, SECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE CHAIxmN 1973-74, 36-37.
112. THE JuDIcIL COUNCIL. OF CALIFORNIA, COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCrATION MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE WITH CALIFORNIA LAv
at 123-38 (1974) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A.--CALIFORNI MINIMUM STANDARDS].
The only significant differences arise in connection with Standards §§1.2, 1.6, and 3.3.
1976 / Plea Bargaining
SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
One of the inherent problems in dealing with the law affecting plea
bargaining is that it is a newly developing area of the law, and agree-
ment does not always exist on what the problems are, let alone how they
should be addressed. There are, however, certain difficulties which have
traditionally drawn the attention of writers in the area, and -they will be
discussed in -this section. In addition, there are areas where California
law is merely unclear or poorly defined, and these will also be dis-
cussed. It should be noted, however, that this is not intended to be an
all-inclusive list of problems to be dealt with in a comprehensive plan,
but merely an attempt to indicate what the more typical and compelling
problems in the plea bargaining area are.
A. Allowable Concessions
Neither the statutes nor the case law in California spell out with
precision exactly what concessions may be offered by a prosecutor to an
accused in order to secure a guilty plea. Rule 11 (e) (1) of the revised
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure establishes three acceptable con-
cessions which the prosecuting attorney may make in negotiating a plea
with the accused, generally based on A.B.A. Standard 3.1(b). These
concessions are a motion for the dismissal of other charges, a recommen-
dation or the nonopposition of a particular sentence, or an agreement
that a particular sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case.
The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure'1 3 and -the Uniform
Rules of Criminal Procedure are generally in accord with this position,
although the latter includes the provisions that "the sentence or other
disposition [may] not exceed specified terms.""' 4 Apparently this clause
was intended to encompass cases involving programs such as Califor-
nia's program for diversion of certain first-time drug offenders.1 5
Although not definitively stated in statutory form, California case law
generally coincides with the A.B.A. position." 6 There are, however,
other commonly granted concessions including: (1) recommendations
for treatment other than imprisonment, such as commitment to a drug
de-toxification program; (2) dismissal of additional or potential charges;
(3) promises to take no additional affirmative action beyond the
prosecution of the offense, such as sentencing recommendations; or
(4) agreements to avoid prosecuting under statutes which either apply a
113. MOD. CODE PRE-ARR. PRoc., supra note 4, §350.3(1) at 65.
114. UN. RuLEs Ca. PRoc., supra note 4, Rule 443 (a) at 173.
115. CAL. PEN. CODE §§1000-1000.4.
116. See generally A.B.A.-CALoRIu Mnqimum STANDmAws, supra note 112, at
135.
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particular label to the convicted party, such as a sex offender, or
increase the sentence, as in the case of robbery while armed with a
firearm. 117 Fundamental fairness would seem to require that the conces-
sions a prosecutor is willing to make should be clearly laid out-if not in
a statewide statutory scheme, at least in every individual prosecutor's
office.1'8 To do otherwise penalizes the less experienced defendant or
defense attorney to an inordinate" degree, and exacerbates the problems
of differential sentencing and discrimination discussed below.1 '
B. Judicial Participation
An area of great controversy among legal writers involves the partici-
pation of the judge in plea negotiations. 20 Rule 11(e)(1) of the
revised Federal Rules specifically precludes the court from participating
in plea negotiations, which generally follows the recommendation of
most writers and drafters of model statutes.' 2 '
California law in this area is unclear, but it appears that there is
nothing to prevent a trial judge from participating in the plea bargaining
process.122 The argument encouraging judicial participation hinges on
the concept that any promise the prosecuting attorney makes without the
prior concurrence of the court is illusory, since only the judge has the
power to impose sentence, and this only leads to compounded problems
later if the plea is not accepted by the court.12 3 The opposing argument
is that the participation of the judge, bringing to bear (whether inten-
tionally or not) all the majesty of his office, exerts undue pressure on the
accused (or his attorney) and thus destroys the requisite voluntariness.
One California court has stated this view as follows: "Experience
suggests that such judicial activity risks more, in terms of unintentional
coercion of defendants, than it gains in promoting understanding and
voluntary pleas. . .."14 The more compelling argument would seem to
be that, under the plea bargaining system as currently structured, judi-
cial participation in the bargaining process should not be condoned.
There is nothing in this position, however, which prevents the judge
117. D. NEWMAN, CONVICTON: THE DETERMINATION OF GuILT OR INNOCENCE
WrrHouT TRuiL 97-98 (1966); Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining: Remediesfor Broken Promises, 11 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 771, 772 (1973).
118. See MOD. CODE PRE-Am. PROC., supra note 4, §350.3(2) at 66; N.A.C. STAND-
ARDs, supra note 4, 3.3 at 52.
119. See notes 152-157 and 166-171 infra and text accompanying.
120. See note 49 supra and text accompanying.
121. A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 4, §3.3 at 11; MOD. CODE PRE-AR. PROC.,
supra note 4, §350.3(1) at 65; N.A.C. STANDARDS, supra note 4, 3.3 at 59; UN. RULES
CR. PIoc., supra note 4, Rule 441(a) at 163.
122. A.B.A.--CALFoRNIu MINIMUM STAND wDs, supra note 4, §3.3 at 137-38.
123. Thomas; supra note 49, at 304.
124. People v. Williams, 269 Cal. App. 2d 879, 884, 75 Cal. Rptr. 348, 351 (1969).
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from indicating prior to the commencement of negotiations the range in
which he would accept a plea agreement, or from indicating, after an
agreement has been proposed, his reasons for rejecting one.'25
C. Correctional Approach
Another area of traditional concern is the lack of a correctional or
rehabilitative approach to the plea bargaining process. It is almost a
matter of common knowledge that our criminal justice system turns out
an extremely cynical product, virtually immune to benefiting from the
correctional process.128 It is not difficult to understand how this can
happen, since under present practice the defendant has probably never
admitted -the crime he actually committed, 7 was convicted of a crime
he did not really commit, and is quite possibly serving a sentence com-
pletely unrelated to his crime, past record, the experience of other per-
petrators of similar crimes, or his psychiatric or correctional needs. One
approach to solving this problem is taken in Rule 32 of the revised Fed-
eral Rules.1 8 This provision, a novel innovation unparalleled by any
provision in California law, allows the judge, after securing the defend-
ant's permission, to view the presentence report prior to the entry of a
plea. Courts frequently criticize high mandatory minnimum sentences,
and allude to the sentencing flexibility of plea bargaining as one of its
key attributes.129 It is difficult to wholeheartedly endorse this position,
however, if -the judge is still operating in an "informational vacuum,"
since the prosecutor has already made his recommendation, and the de-
fendant (and his attorney) are only concerned with securing as low a
sentence as possible. The recommendation suggested in the revised Fed-
eral Rules goes beyond the position of the A.B.A. Standards, which calls
only for -the acceptance of a plea based on -the condition that nothing ad-
verse to the information provided by counsel appears in the presentence
125. MOD. CODE PRE-ARm. PROC., supra note 3, at 111 (Commentary on Article
350).
126. See generally Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in TASK FoRCa REPORT,
supra note 16, at 112; Klein, Habitual Offender Legislation and the Bargaining Process,
15 CRiM. L.Q. 417 (1973) (quote from anonymous interview); N.A.C. STANDARDS,
supra note 4, at 44 (citation omitted); Comment, Judicial Supervision over California
Plea Bargaining: Regulating the Trade, 59 CAL. L. REv. 962, 968, 985-90 (1971);
Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286, 298-99 (1972).
127. "[Pleas resulting from plea bargains] do not represent a true acknowledge-
ment and acceptance of guilt by the defendant-universally regarded as a first step
toward rehabilitation-but are more likely viewed by him as an expedient manipulation
of the system." Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 16, at 112.
128. Rule 32(c)(1), PROP. AMEND. TO FED. RULES CR. PROC., supra note 3 at.67.
129. See, e.g., People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 605, 477 P.2d 409, 414, 91 Cal. Rptr.
385, 390 (1970). Note, however, that a contra argument can be made that pleading
guilty to a different offense than actually committed, even though "reasonably related,"
defeats the intent of society in establishing certain penalties for specific offenses.
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report. ° The advisory note to the proposed Federal Rules does an
excellent job of stating the argument in favor of this change:
It enables the judge to have all of the information available to him
at the time he is called upon to decide whether or not to accept the
plea of guilty and thus avoids the necessity of a subsequent appear-
ance whenever the information is such that the judge decides to re-
ject the plea agreement.13'
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Adminis-
tration of Justice takes the same position,132 as do the Uniform Rules of
Criminal Procedure' 3 and the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Proce-
dure,134 although they do not require the defendants permission to be
obtained before the presentence report may be ordered. The commen-
tary on the Model Code stresses that "it is essential that [defense]
counsel come to see the design of a rehabilitation program to meet their
client's particular stituation as an important part of their responsibili-
ty."' 35 Such an innovative approach would seem adaptable to California
criminal practice, and could possibly alleviate some of the public criti-
cism of the plea bargaining practice. 3 '
D. Disclosure of the Plea Bargain
Another area of ambiguity in California law is the lack of any specific
reference in statutory law to plea bargaining per se as a component of
the criminal justice system. There is some danger in this, in that a court
might not uncover the existence of a plea bargain, and might thereby
leave the defendant with little remedy if the terms of the bargain are not
adhered to.' 37 Non-disclosure also tends to shield any abuses in the
process which led to the bargain.'38
In light of the California Supreme Court's recognition of the propriety
of plea bargaining in West, there seems to be little reason for not
granting outright recognition to the practice in any comprehensive
scheme adopted by the California legislature or courts. This was one of
the main motivating factors prompting the revisions to the Federal
Rules, 3"' which call for disclosure of the existence of any plea agreement
130. A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 4, §3.3(b) at 11-12.
131. ADvisORY CoMMITrE NOTE, supra note 47, at 69.
132. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 16, at 12.
133. UN. RULES Ca. PRoc., supra note 4, Rule 443(b) at 174-75.
134. MOD. CODE PRE-ARR. PROc., supra note 4, §§350.3(4) at 66, 350.5(2)(a)-(b)
(3) at 72.
135. MOD. CODE PRE-ARR. PROC., supra note 4, at 112 (Commentary on Article
350).
136. See notes 172-179 infra and text accompanying.
137. See, e.g., Hilliard v. Beto, 465 F.2d 829, 831-32 (5th Cir. 1972).
138. MOD. CODE PRE-ARR. PROC., supra note 4, at 74 (Note on Section 350.5).
139. See note 47 supra and text accompanying.
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in open court,140 thereby removing any lingering uncertainty still con-
nected with the practice. Writers on the subject are unanimous in their
belief that full disclosure is an essential ingredient of a sound plea
bargaining procedure.141
E. Advice to the Defendant
Yet another area of California law which requires clarification is the
advice which the trial judge must give to the defendant at the time a plea
is entered. The constitutional requirements demand a showing that the
guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and entered with a full understand-
ing of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.142
There is no precise delineation, however, regarding what must be con-
tained in the trial court's discussion with the defendant to give some
assurance that these goals will be met. As an example, there is presently
no requirement that the court issue a warning listing the specific rights
waived by a particular defendant in pleading guilty. 14 3 In the interest of
"erring on the side of caution,"' 44 it would seem wise for California to
adopt a policy of having trial courts issue complete warnings regarding
the consequences which may accompany a guilty plea in a given case.
One of the stated purposes for revising the Federal Rules was to clarify
"the advice which the court must give to insure that the defendant
who pleads guilty has made an informed plea,"145 and the new rules do
spell out with, some precision the dialogue which must take place
between the judge and the defendant to insure that the defendant is
aware of the rights he is waiving. The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure and Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure contain additional
provisions which should be considered for inclusion in a comprehensive
scheme in California. For example, these model codes call for advice to
the accused that evidence obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights may not be used against him.146 In addition, they call for warn-
ings about possibilities of consecutive sentences and limitations on pa-
role eligibility.' 47 The new Federal Rules, as amended in Congress
140. Rule 11(e) (2), PROP. AMEND. TO FED. RULES CR. PROC., supra note 3, at 26.
141. MOD. CODE PRE-APJ. PRoc., supra note 4, §350.51(1) at 72; N.A.C. STANDARDS,
supra note 4, 3.2 at 50; UN. RULES CR. PRoc., supra note 4, Rule 444(b)(2) at 181.
See A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 4, §3.3 at 11-12.
142. See notes 24-32 supra and text accompanying.
143. See note 22 supra and text accompanying.
144. See note 81 supra and text accompanying.
145. ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE, supra note 47, at 27. See notes 54-56 supra and
text accompanying.
146. MoD. CODE PE-AMR. PRoc., supra note 4, §350.4(1) (d) at 69; UN. RULES Ca.
PRoc., supra note 4, Rule 444(b) (1) (iv) at 177.
147. MOD. CODE PIE-ARR. PROC., supra note 4, §350.4(1) (e) (ii) at 69; UN. RULES
Cp. PROC., supra note 4, Rules 444(b) (1) (ii), (iii) at 177.
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do a better job of advising of the right to counsel, 48 although this would
be made unnecessary by a provision such as that contained in the Uni-
form Rules, which requires the trial judge to verify that the defendant
has received "adequate legal services.""' The requirement of a factual
basis for the plea, currently required in California, is considered de-
sirable by all writers.'" The Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Pro-
cedure adds the provision that admission of guilt by the defendant is
not required for conviction. 151 The advantages of a precise listing of
the discussions a judge is to have with an accused are to ensure uni-
form treatment of all criminal defendants, and to minimize the possi-
bility of collateral attack by insuring that the required elements of "un-
derstanding," and "voluntariness" are dealt with in a thorough and open
manner.
F. Differential Sentencing
Differential sentencing is the imposition of a more severe sentence for
conviction as the result of a trial than from pleading guilty.' 52 The
obvious result of this practice is to discourage the exercise of the
constitutional right to a trial by jury. An affirmative policy of differen-
tial sentencing is a denial of due process; 15' however, the line between
an aggressive plea bargaining policy and at least the intimation of dif-
ferential sentencing is a fine one. The classic answer to the problem is
that while it is unacceptable -to impose a heavier sentence for asserting
the right to trial, it is permissible to give lighter sentences in the event
of a guilty plea.' The A.B.A. Standards take this approach, listing
several criteria which may be considered in determining sentence.'"
Both the N.A.C. Standards and 'the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
procedure specifically prohibit the practice of differential sentencing.,"
An innovative solution which has been proposed calls for the judge,
after he has had full access to the facts, to offer a defendant a choice of a
148. Rule 11(c)(2), (3), H.R. 6799, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) at 4-5.
149. UN. RuLEs CR. PRoc., supra note 4, Rule 444(b) (1) at 177.
150. A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 4, §1.6 at 8; MOD. CODE PRE-ARR. PROC., supra
note 4, §350.4(3) at 70; N.A.C. STANDARDS, supra note 4, 3.7 at 60; UN. RULES Ct.
PRoc., supra note 4, Rule 444(b)(3) at 182.
151. MOD. CODE PRE-ARR. PRoc., supra note 4, §350.4(4) at 70.
152. Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in TASK FoRcE REPOR', supra note 16,
at 111.
153. Note, The Legitimation of Plea Bargaining: Remedies for Broken Promises,
11 AM. Cram. L. REv. 771, 777 (1973).
154. United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960).
155. A.B.A. STANDARDS, supra note 4, §1.8 at 8; Accord, Hoffman, Plea Bargaining
and the Role of the Judge, 53 F.R.D. 499 (1972); Contra, N.A.C. STANDARDS, supra note
4, 3.8 at 64.
156. MoD. CODE PRE-AM. PROC., supra note 4, §350.3(a), (b) at 66; N.A.C.
STANDARDS, supra note 4, 3.8 at 64.
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specified sentence if he is found guilty at trial, or a sentence for a guilty
plea, reduced by standard factors which apply in all cases of similar
offenses.15 7 Notwithstanding the admitted difficulty of developing these
"factors," this is an approach which has some merit, and seems worthy
of experimentation.
G. Overcharging
A practice as common as differential sentencing, and as infrequently
the subject of collateral attack, is overcharging. 158 Overcharging can
either be "vertical"-charging a more serious degree of the crime than
supported by the evidence, or "horizontal"-charging additional crimes.
It is a particularly despicable practice, because the main attention of a
defendant in determining whether to waive his constitutional rights and
enter a guilty plea should be focused on the maximum sentence likely in
the jurisdiction, not the theoretical maximum.159 Overcharging and
other coercive practices'60 such as threatening a more severe sentence
for pleading not guilty or threatening to charge a crime not ordinarily
charged exist because much of the negotiation process leading to a guilty
plea has traditionally taken place out of the public eye, and without any
direct supervision by the court. 6 ' As Mr. Justice Douglas has said,
"Plea bargaining . . . leaves with the prosecutor the power to set the
price for the exercise of those [constitutional] rights."' 62
At a minimum, such tactics should be expressly forbidden, a position
taken by both the N.A.C. Standards' 63 and the Model Code of Pre-
Arraignment Procedure. 64 It would seem that as an enforcement de-
vice, automatic reversal of any conviction obtained by the use of such
practices should be imposed-under the same rationale that the exclu-
sionary rule is utilized to supress evidence obtained by improper police
conduct.'6 5
157. Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE LJ. 286, 301 (1972).
158. MOD. CODE PRE-ARR. PROc., supra note 4, at 106 (Commentary on Article
350).
159. MOD. CODE PRE-AnR. PRoc., supra note 4, at 106 (Commentary on Article
350).
160. See Thomas, supra note 49, at 310 for the suggestion that defense counsel can
also exert a coercive influence.
161. "The greatest danger of the current practice lies in its secretiveness." People
v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 609, 477 P.2d 409, 417, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 393 (1970).
162. Corpus Et Al. v. Estelle, Corrections Director, Et Al., 469 F.2d 646, 953, 956,
1075 (1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 932, 933 (1973) (Douglas, and Marshall, JJ., dis-
senting).
163. N.A.C. STANDARDs, supra note 4, 3.6 at 57.
164. MOD. CoDE PRE-Alm. PRoc., supra note 4, §350.3(3)(c) at 66.
165. Another solution to this problem which has been suggested involves a complete
revision of the hearing-arraignment procedures, but a discussion of the merits of this pro-
posal exceeds the scope of this comment. See generally Note, Plea Bargaining: The
Case for Reform, 6 U. RICH, L. Rv. 325 (1972); Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain,
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H. Discrimination Against Certain Types of Defendants
Under the plea bargaining system presently in use, certain types of
defendants are the objects of a subtle yet nonetheless real form of
discrimination in that they receive higher sentences than others charged
with the same offense.1 66 The neophyte offender, unaware of the subtle-
ties of the system, is at a disadvantage compared to the ex-convict. 10 7
The defendant represented by inexperienced or inadequate counsel also
suffers under the present system,16 8 as does the individual charged with
a highly visible or publicly notorious offense.'6 9
To some extent, problems in this area can be solved by establishing
uniform published procedures in every prosecutor's office, a recommen-
dation made by both the National Advisory Commission and the Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.170 The recommendation of the
National Advisory Commission includes a prohibition against a prosecu-
tor basing a decision of whether or not to seek a negotiated plea on how
strong his case is. As the president's Commission on Law Enforcement
has indicated, the "integrity of the system" is jeopardized when the
prosecution is not called upon to submit its evidence to the test of a
court trial.17 1 Such provisions, while leaving prosecutors ample leeway
to uphold the best interests of the people, go a long way -toward achiev-
ing equal treatment for all criminal defendants.
I. Service to the Needs of Society
Perhaps the most serious charge which can be leveled at the present
plea bargaining system is that it generates cynicism among the general
public as well as among those who are subject to it.1 72 Professor Donald
Newman, perhaps the most distinguished author on the subject of plea
bargaining,1 73 lists four concerns which affect the formation of a posi-
tive public attitude. These center on the arguments that:
[1] The state becoming involved in bargaining with criminals over
82 YALE L.J. 286 (1972); Comment, Profile of a Guilty Plea: A Proposed Trial Court
Procedure for Accepting Guilty Pleas, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1195 (1971).
166. See Newman and NeMoyer supra note 50, at 389-90.
167. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 16, at 11. That a former offender should re-
ceive a more lenient sentence than the first offender is, of course, directly contrary to
all concepts of correctional theory.
168. Comment, Judicial Supervision over California Plea Bargaining: Regulating the
Trade, 59 CAL. L. REv. 962, 994 (1971).
169. Id. at 967.
170. MOD. CODE PRE-Am Pnoc., supra note 4, §350.3(2) at 66; N.A.C. STANDARDS,
supra note 4, 3.3 at 52.
171. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 16, at 10.
172. Newman & NeMoyer, supra note 50, at 396.
173. See generally D. NEWMAN, CONVIaTION: THE DETERMINATION OF QUILT OR
INrNOCENcE WrrHoUT TRAL (1966).
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charges and sentences is inherently repugnant in a society dedi-
cated to the rule of law ....
[2] Plea bargaining makes a mockery of our system of justice ....
[3] Because of the intrinsic "horse trading" or "settling out of
court" nature of plea negotiations, an aura of disrespect for justice
and for criminal procedure is produced not only among those in-
volved but also among the public in general ....
[4] There is public dissatisfaction with the relative lack of detail
emerging from guilty plea convictions, particularly in cases where
there is a high degree of public interest.174
The incident involving Senator Edward Kennedy is cited in support of
this latter point, and certainly the case involving former Vice-President
Spiro Agnew is in a similar vein. 75 Other authorities have alluded to
this same problem,176 and it seems imperative that public confidence in
the criminal justice system be restored. Whenever the "crime problem"
is discussed in the media, plea bargaining is a prime topic for discus-
sion, 177 and it seems evident that a society that does not have complete
confidence that its criminal processes are serving its best interests is
indeed on a shaky foundation.
Like the other problems discussed in this section, the most important
step toward alleviating the problem of public distrust would be to
completely remove any vestige of secrecy surrounding the plea bargain-
ing process and to "let -the fresh light of open analysis expose both the
prior discussions and agreements of the parties, as well as the court's
reasons for its resolution of the matter."'' 78 A step toward this goal could
be made by adoption of a provision in the Model Code of Pre-Arraign-
ment Procedure which states that a plea shall not be adopted unless it is
in the public interest in that it takes into account not only the
benefit to the public in securing a prompt disposition of the case,
but also the importance of a disposition that furnishes the public
adequate protection and does not depreciate the seriousness of the
offense or promote disrespect for the law.179
174. Newman & NeMoyer, supra note 50, at 396-99.
175. "Mhe Agnew situation... left a bad taste in the mouth of practically every-
one but Mr. Agnew ... ." CoMMrrrEE ON THE JuDicIARY HOUSE OF REPREsENTA-
TIVES, COMMENTARY: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PRO-
cEDuRu 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. at 3 (1974) (letter from Adrian A. Spears, U.S. District
Judge, to Representative Henry B. Gonzales).
176. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 16, at 9; Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargain-
ing, in TASK FoRcE REPORT, supra note 16, at 111; N.A.C. STANDARDS, supra note 4, at
44.
177. See, e.g., TIME Vol. 105, No. 27 at 20 (June 30, 1975).
178. People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 609, 477 P.2d 409, 417, 91 Cal. Rptr. 385, 393(1970). See also Newman & NeMoyer, supra note 50, at 404.
179. MOD. CODE PRE-ARR. PROc., supra note 4, §350.5(2) (c) at 73. This provision
is included in a suggested code section entitled "Additional Action To Be Taken By The
Court Where There Is Plea Agreement,"
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CONCLUSION
In the past, many problems resulted from the clandestine atmosphere
in which plea bargaining was conducted, most notably the failure to
develop an adequate procedure for dealing with the guilty pleas which
resulted from plea bargains. The plea bargaining process has come a
long way, however, in gaining ,the recognition and respect of both
practitioners and the courts-if not the general public. The next logical
step in further refining this process is to develop a comprehensive
scheme of plea bargaining law for California, drawing upon the best of
our existing law and the suggestions of those groups who have devel-
oped models in the area. However, care should be taken to insure that
the goal of early disposition of cases reflects more than "the defend-
ant's natural desire for lenient treatment and the prosecutor's concern
with managing his caseload."' s0
Lawrence A. Bennett
180. MOD. CODE PRiE-Aim. PROC., supra note 4, at 112 (Commentary on Article
350).
